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HAS THE FINANCIAL CRISIS SHATTERED 
CITIZENS’ TRUST IN NATIONAL AND  
EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS? 
CEPS WORKING DOCUMENT NO. 343/FEBRUARY 2011 
FELIX ROTH, FELICITAS NOWAK-LEHMANN D. AND THOMAS OTTER
* 
Introduction 
The financial crisis has severely affected citizens’ trust in the European institutions in the direct 
aftermath of 16 September 2008. Citizens’ net trust in the European Central Bank (ECB) (Roth, 
2009a; Roth, 2009b; Gros and Roth, 2009; Gros and Roth, 2010; Roth, 2011) has dramatically 
declined, despite partly recovering from June 2009 onwards. In contrast to citizens’ net trust in 
European institutions, citizens’ net trust in national governments initially increased in most EU 
countries in the direct aftermath of the financial crisis (Roth, 2009a). This Working Document 
analyses the determinants of trends in citizens’ net trust in the national and European political 
institutions. More precisely it analyses the determinants of citizens’ net trust in the national 
governments and parliaments, as well the European Commission and European Parliament, for 
the last decade and particularly before and after the financial crisis. 
1. Theoretical  links 
Since late 2008 governments and supranational institutions have had to face severe challenges 
arising from critical economic (financial and growth crises) and social events (the social impacts 
of the economic crisis). In consequence of these events, trust and confidence in national 
governments and European institutions (the European Commission and European Parliament) 
are changing visibly. These trends bring to the fore questions regarding the determinants of trust 
and its performance during periods that are rather determined by crisis than by normality. Given 
the global financial and political challenges, citizens’ scepticism towards major economic and 
governmental institutions has been increasing. But what is behind this scepticism? 
Extensive literature shows that people have confidence in their leaders (people or institutions) 
when the government is working well. Uslaner (2003) argues that their perceptions and opinions 
about government performance reflect their evaluations of specific personalities, institutions and 
policies. Thus, when the government does not produce the outcomes envisaged, trust is expected 
to be lower. 
                                                      
* Felix Roth is a Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies, Place du Congrès 1, 1000 
Brussels, Belgium and a Research Associate at the Ibero America Institute, University of Göttingen, 
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1.1  Trust in government 
Since the late 1960s and early 1970s, public trust in government and political institutions has 
been falling in all advanced industrialised democracies (Blind, 2006, citing Wattenberg and 
Dalton, 2000). Additionally, Dalton and Wattenberg (2000) show that in industrialised 
democracies as well the trust in political parties is eroding. And related to this, public 
confidence in parliaments has similarly decreased in the recent decade (Blind, 2006, citing 
Dalton, 2004, chapter 2). The general decline in trust covers several areas, government, 
parliament and political parties (Blind, 2006). In a later work, Dalton shows that even if the 
pattern and the pace of the fall in trust are dissimilar across countries, the downward trend is 
generalised (Blind, 2006, citing Dalton, 2005). “Except for the Netherlands, which showed 
increased trust in the government from the 1970s until the mid-1990s, all of the other advanced 
industrialised democracies recorded a decline in the level of trust” in government (Blind, 2006).  
In his literature review, Blind (2006) argues that “[s]ome of the symptoms of this so-called 
“democratic malaise” of declining of trust in advanced industrialized democracies (Tanguay, 
1999, 325-26) are the declining voter turnout (Gray and Caul, 2000, Eagles, 1999), youth 
disinterested in politics (Adsett, 2003) and decreasing levels of civic involvement (Saul, 1995, 
Putnam, 2000)”. Blind adds that of course symptoms do not explain the causes of the declining 
trust, and many different factors may be behind the decline. Periods of low economic growth 
and public fear that governments have been incapable of dealing with previous or current fiscal 
and financial challenges are among them (Blind, 2006, citing Mansbridge, 1997; Newton and 
Norris, 2000). 
People trust more in governments that have shown the capacity to generate economic growth, 
create jobs, provide access to social services and perform in a transparent manner (Fiorina, 
1978; Mackuen, Erikson and Stimson, 1992). Nye (1997) argues that citizens’ negative 
perceptions of their national economy and governments’ ability to respond to these challenges 
could create even more distrust in the age of globalisation.  
Dalton (2005) argues that a decline in trust is happening across countries with diverse 
institutional structures, historical and cultural roots and determinants. He argues that even if 
some characteristics of social and political trust are country-specific, the possible explanations 
for this decline and potential solutions to the declining trust in government might very well be 
grounded in the new requirements imposed by globalisation (Dalton, 2005). 
1.2  Trust in European institutions 
Bonet, Munoz and Trocal (2007) argue that when using explanations of changing levels of 
political confidence in the European Parliament, we must keep in mind the supranational 
character of this institution. They also hold that in recent years, public opinion regarding the 
work of the EU is more and more important for its legitimacy, in consequence of the transfer of 
competencies from the member state to the European level. 
The same authors mention that a different approach conceives support for European integration 
as a result of a cost benefit analysis perceived by citizens. The scholars in this tradition have 
developed several models mainly relating economic variables to represent the benefit, as 
determinants for citizens’ support for European integration (Hooghe and Marks, 2005). Bonet, 
Munoz and Torcal (2007) maintain that one of the most robust economic models is Gabel’s 
(Gabel, 1998b; Gabel, 1998a) distributional theory. Gabel’s argument, which supports the 
importance of economic benefits as an outcome of EU integration, centres on the low affective 
identification citizens have with EU institutions. HAS THE FINANCIAL CRISIS SHATTERED CITIZENS’ TRUST? | 3 
 
2. Previous  findings 
2.1  Trust and support for governments 
Many findings regarding trust in governments have already been reported in the previous 
section. A similar but slightly different approach is known under the name of ‘popularity 
functions’, which aims at explaining the determinants of support to governments, whereby a 
positive attitude towards support supposes the existence of a required existing level of trust. 
Nannestad and Paldam (1994) review 25 years of research and literature on voters and 
popularity (VP) functions, which explain the support for the government at elections and public 
opinion polls using economic and political variables. Most studies apply time series 
methodologies, with the usage of macroeconomic variables. Nannestad and Paldam (1994) 
argue that the VP theory starts from the hypothesis that voters hold the government responsible 
for economic conditions. The authors find that such a system “works in two-party/block 
systems, but nowhere else. Voters in most countries are found to be sociotropic. Egotropic 
voting also occurs. Voters’ myopia is well established. Voting is retrospective as expectations 
are static” (Nannestad and Paldam, 1994: 213).  
In their review, Nannestad and Paldam find that “nearly all studies made have found highly 
significant VP functions, and a clear pattern appears in the results. Only a few studies, such as 
Dinkel (1982) and Norpoth and Yantek (1983a and 1983b), have denied the very existence of 
the VP function” (Nannestad and Paldam, 1994: 214). For our paper the most relevant findings 
in literature, reported by Nannestad and Paldam, are i) “voters hold the government responsible 
for the development in the economy” and ii) “a good economic development increases the 
popularity of the government, while a bad development decreases the popularity” (both findings 
in Nannestad and Paldam, 1994: 215). Their third important finding for our study is that most 
econometric models on VP functions that have been reviewed find usually a very limited 
number of macroeconomic variables really in the sense of the responsibility hypothesis. For 
industrialised countries the two most important variables are unemployment and inflation 
(Nannestad and Paldam, 1994: 216).  
Using data from the last government change in Germany, Kirchgässner (2009) finds some 
evidence that even if the impact of unemployment and inflation on the electoral success (or 
failure) of German governments from the 1950s to the 1990s can be taken for certain, more 
recent electoral results seem to show a changing trend. Unemployment no longer seems to have 
the same strong impact as before. Considering these results, Kirchgässner raises the question of 
how far voters really hold the government responsible for economic developments. To better 
analyse future VP functions, he proposes to distinguish three different situations: “i) 
governments are really responsible, ii) governments claim to be responsible, and iii) 
governments are held responsible by the electorate for economic development” (Kirchgässner, 
2009: 14). 
Roth (2009a, 2009b) finds that net trust in the national government and parliament has actually 
increased in the direct aftermath of the financial crisis. This finding that citizens’ trust increases 
in times of crisis has already been elaborated upon by Chanley (2002) and is called the “rally 
around the flag” effect (Hetherington and Nelson, 2003). 
2.2  Trust and support for EU 
Sinnott and Lyons (2003) find that increasing people’s knowledge and understanding of EU 
institutions and of the European Parliament makes it much more likely that they will notice and 
respond to appeals, or make use of their votes for European elections. In the same sense, 
Constantelos and Diven’s (2010) analysis of European public opinion indicates that citizens’ 4 | ROTH, NOWAK-LEHMANN D. & OTTER 
 
confidence in the EU depends on their general trust in major social and political institutions, 
such as national governments, rather than on a general propensity to be trusting of other people.  
Biernat (2007) finds
1 that there is no homogeneous level of trust towards EU institutions in the 
different member states. Even if it is difficult to find clear, unique patterns of factors related to 
political support there seem to exist spatial structures, which mark some differences in trust 
levels and its characteristics towards the EU. In Western and southern Europe, the EU seems to 
be perceived more like an institution with characteristics similar to the national political system. 
In contrast, in Britain and Eastern Europe, a much clearer perception of a non-national European 
sphere can be observed. The author identifies three main factors that determine general trust in 
the EU: “trust in national parliament, satisfaction with EU democracy, and trust in the social 
security system” (Biernat, 2007, p. 7). Additionally, the author finds that trust in national 
governments and satisfaction with national systemic performance reinforces trust in the EU.
2 
The results by Hooghe and Marks (2005) confirm the importance of economic factors in 
determining citizens’ trust in the EU. They use Eurobarometer data to measure the relative 
impact of economic aspects and of community identity on European public opinion. They find 
that both factors are important. Nevertheless, identity has a more profound impact on trust levels 
in the EU than economic self-interest. 
Roth (2009a, 2009b) finds that trust in the European Parliament and European Commission 
have quite significantly decreased due to the financial crisis. 
3.  Data and measurement 
3.1 Operationalisation 
Trust in the national governments, national parliaments, the European Commission and the 
European Parliament was measured by asking citizens the following question: “For each of the 
following European bodies, please tell me if you tend to trust it or not to trust it.” The 
respondent was then presented with a range of European institutions.
3 Next to the answers 
“[t]end to trust it” and “[t]end not to trust it”, the third category “[d]on’t know” (DK) was also 
given by the respondent.
4 The best measure of trust seems to be ‘net trust’, which is obtained by 
subtracting the percentage of those who trust from those who do not trust the institution.
5  
3.2 Model  specifications 
Our model specification includes the classical macroeconomic variables as specified in the 
popularity function literature (Nannestad and Paldam, 1994)
6 plus the additional variable of debt 
                                                      
1 The author used data from the European Values Survey and the Eurobarometer 62 (2004) for 14 EU 
countries.  
2 When all plausible economic and political explanations are accounted for, identity (let alone religion) 
have but minor additional influence. The implication is that neither culture, identity nor religion poses a 
long-term threat to the consolidation of popular support or the level of trust. 
3 Next to the European Commission and the European Parliament, a range of other European institutions 
such as the ECB are included in the Eurobarometer’s trust item battery. 
4 DK answers can easily reach values of 20 percentage points and more. Furthermore, the DK answers 
fluctuate over time.  
5 This approach is used in public opinion research in particular and is able to control for the fluctuations 
in the DK answers. The same approach of using net trust in the ECB was also chosen by Gros & Roth 
2009, Roth (2009a) and Roth (2009b). 
6 The popularity function literature normally additionally includes political variables (Nannestad and 
Paldam (1994), p. 218).  HAS THE FINANCIAL CRISIS SHATTERED CITIZENS’ TRUST? | 5 
 
per GDP in order to address the dramatic increases of debt in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis. In the baseline model with an unbalanced panel, net trust in the national 
government/parliament and net trust in the European Commission/Parliament are estimated as a 
function of inflation, growth of GDP per capita, unemployment, debt per GDP and important 
control variables. The baseline growth model for the fixed-effects estimation is as follows: 
Trust in national and European governmental institutions i,t = αi + β Inflation i,t-1 +  
χ  Growth i,t-1 + δ Unemployment i,t-1 + ε  Debt per GDP i,t-1  + φ  Z i,t-1 + wi,t,   (1) 
where i represents each country and t represents each time period; Trust…i,t is the net trust 
amount for country i during period t; Inflation i,t-1, Growth i,t-1, Unemployment i,t-1, Debt per GDP 
i,t-1 and Z i,t-1 are, respectively, inflation, growth of GDP per capita, unemployment, debt per 
GDP and important control variables such as public expenditure, the debt level of GDP and the 
US dollar/euro exchange rate for country i during period t-1; αi represents a country-specific 
constant term and wi,t is the error term. For analytical reasons, we allow the error term to be 
composed of an error due to omitted variables  it v  and an i.i.d. error  it it it u v w + = . This point 
becomes relevant when we present our estimation technique. 
3.3  Measurement of data 
Data on trust in the national government, the national parliament, the European Commission 
and the European Parliament are based upon the biannual Eurobarometer survey.
7 The first 
observation, using the information from spring 1999, is derived from the Standard 
Eurobarometer 51.
8 From then onwards the Standard Eurobarometer data until Eurobarometer 
72 is taken. Furthermore, to precisely measure the effect of the financial crisis on net trust in the 
ECB, the observation from the Special Eurobarometer 71.1 in January–February 2009 is taken 
into consideration.  
•  Data on GDP are taken from Eurostat’s quarterly data. The data are chain-linked with 
2000 as the reference year.
9 As the Eurobarometer fieldwork normally takes place 
around April–May and October–November,
10 we constructed GDP semester data by 
adding the two previous quarters (e.g. April to September 1998 (second plus
  third 
                                                      
7 The raw data are available on CD-ROM from Gesis ZA Data Service for Standard Eurobarometers 51-
62 (Gesis, 2005a, 2005b) and received on request from Gesis ZA Data Service for Standard 
Eurobarometers 63-69 (http://www.gesis.org/en/services/data/survey-data/eurobarometer-data-
service/data-access/). Data for the Standard Eurobarometer 70 were taken from Eurobarometer (2008, 
2009a). Data for the Special Eurobarometer 71.1 were taken from Eurobarometer (2009b). Data from the 
Eurobarometer 71 were taken from Eurobarameter (2009c). Data from Eurobarometer 72 were taken from 
Eurobarometer (2009d). 
8 As the data were originally constructed for the project “Who can be trusted after this financial crisis?”, 
which strongly centred on trust in the ECB, the time period of 1999 onwards was chosen. 
9 Chain-linking is a methodology to calculate GDP values at constant prices. In particular the previous 
year is used as a base year instead of a single fixed year, which is moved every five years. The year 2000 
is used as a reference year, for which the deflators are expressed as equal to 100. 
10 The fieldwork most often takes place in April–May or October–November. However, although this 
fluctuates and as it is not possible to change the research design throughout the dataset, it was assumed 
that the Standard Eurobarometer in spring was polled in April–May and the one in autumn polled in 
October–November. More precisely, the polling for the Standard Eurobarometers took place in the 
following months: 05/1999, 11/1999, 05/2000, 12/2000, 05/2001, 11/2001, 05/2002, 11/2002, 04/2003, 
11/2003, 03/2004, 10/2004, 05/2005, 10/2005, 04/2006, 09/2006, 04/2007, 10/2007, 04/2008, 11/2008, 
2/2009, 06/2009 and 10/2009. 6 | ROTH, NOWAK-LEHMANN D. & OTTER 
 
quarter of 1998) plus October 1998 to March 1999 (fourth
 quarter of 1998 and first 
quarter of 1999) to match it with the Standard Eurobarometer observation in May 
1999). As in 2009, we had three observations for net confidence/trust in the ECB – the 
Standard Eurobarometer 71, conducted in June 2009, was exceptionally matched with 
the first and second quarters of GDP in 2009. Data on GDP are missing for Bulgaria, for 
Romania and for the first two semesters for Greece and Malta. 
•  Data on inflation rates are based on Eurostat’s monthly HICP indicator. Semester data 
were constructed by averaging monthly data, in accordance with the construction of 
GDP, from March to September and from October to the end of February. As discussed 
above, the Standard Eurobarometer 71, conducted in June 2009, was exceptionally well 
matched with the first and second quarters of GDP in 2009.  
•  Data on population, unemployment, government debt and the final government 
consumption expenditure have been derived from Eurostat. Semester data were 
constructed in a similar manner as for GDP and inflation. Data are missing on 
government debt for the first two semesters except for Belgium, France and Romania. 
Furthermore, the values for unemployment are missing for the first two semesters for 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia and Malta. The quarterly population data was inter- and 
extrapolated to replace the missing values.  
4. Descriptive  statistics 
Figure 1 shows the time trend in net levels of trust in the European Commission and national 
governments for the 27 member states of the euro area as measured by the twice-annual 
Eurobarometer surveys since the beginning of the financial crisis. Whereas one detects a 
continuing decline in trust in the European Commission from spring 2007 until February 2009, 
with an increase in net trust from February 2009 onwards,
11 citizens’ trust in national 
governments follows a diametric trend in the aftermath of the Lehman crisis in autumn 2008 
and February 2009, in which citizens’ trust actually increased. 
Figure 1. Trust trends in national governments and the European Commission in the aftermath 
of the financial crisis in the EU-27 
 
Source: Own calculations; Eurobarometer: Standard EB Nos. 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72 and Special EB 71.1. 
                                                      
11 The most recent evidence from the Standard Eurobarometer 73 indicates a drop in the trust trend. 
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This finding has already been shown by Roth (2009a, 2009b) and can generally be identified as 
the rally-around-the-flag phenomena (Hetherington and Nelson, 2003), which means that in 
times of crisis citizens’ trust in the national institutions actually increases on a short-term basis 
(see here also Chanley, 2001). The same pattern can be detected when analysing the trust trends 
in the national parliament and the European Parliament in Figure 2, which shows the time trend 
in net levels of trust in the European Parliament and national parliament for the 27 member 
states of the euro area as measured by the twice-annual Eurobarometer surveys.  
Figure 2. Trust trends in national parliaments and the European Parliament in the aftermath of 
the financial crisis in the EU-27 
 
Source: Own calculations; Eurobarometer: Standard EB Nos. 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72 and Special EB 71.1. 
Figure 3
12 shows the trust trends in the national governments for the three European economies 
Germany, France and Spain. The figure visualises once more the rally-around-the-flag effect in 
January/February 2009, where we can even observe an increase in the trust of Spanish citizens. 
Whereas in the core countries Germany and France the trust level in the national government 
(and as well national parliament – see Roth, 2011) remained at the same level as before the 
financial crisis, in the peripheral country Spain the trust level decreased by a staggering 76%, 
from a trust level in spring 2008 of +20% to a level of -56%.  
Figure 3. Trust in national parliaments in Germany, France and Spain 
 
Source: Own calculations; Eurobarometer: Standard EB Nos. 69, 70, 71, 72, 73 and Special EB 71.1. 
                                                      
12 Figure 3 already shows observations from Eurobarometer 73. Figures 1, 2 and 4 and the econometric 
analysis have not yet utilised the data of Eurobarometer 73. This will be done in upcoming months.  
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Figure 4 visualises the above-mentioned rally-around-the-flag effect in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis for an EU-15 country sample. The picture clarifies that in the direct aftermath of 
the crisis a decline in growth of GDP is associated with an increase of net trust in the national 
government, whereas an increase in growth of GDP per capita (in the period of economic 
recovery) is associated with declining trust in the national government. This finding already 
indicates that not only does a politically motivated crisis, such as the attacks on the twin towers 
on 9/11 (Chanley, 2002), but also an economically motivated crisis triggers a rally-around-the-
flag effect.   
Figure 4. Scatterplot between delta growth and delta trust in the national government in the 
direct aftermath of the financial crisis 
 
Source: Own calculations; Eurobarometer: Standard EB Nos. 69, 70 and Special EB 71.1. 
5. Econometric  analysis 
To analyse the determinants of net trust in the national government/parliament and European 
Commission/Parliament over a longer time horizon, the fixed effects dynamic ordinary least 
squares (DOLS) or a feasible generalised least squares (FGLS) estimation method is used (see 
Table 1). There are basically three econometric issues that deserve discussion beforehand. One 
is whether and how to control for omitted variables and whether the inclusion of time fixed 
effects is an adequate approach; the second issue is about structural breaks or whether inflation, 
growth and unemployment influence trust in the national and European institutions the same 
way under normal economic conditions and in times of crisis. The third issue concerns the 
endogeneity of the explanatory variables. 
5.1  The issue of dealing with unexpected events and/or omitted variables 
In econometric modelling we have to deal very often with unquantifiable or unobservable 
events (or both). In the panel data literature it has become very common to work with fixed time 
dummies in order to proxy events that are identical for all countries in the sample but change 
over time. In contrast to traditional panel data studies, we do not favour the use of time 
dummies. We have reason to believe that countries (our cross-sections) are usually very 
differently affected by the same ‘general’ event. With respect to the 25/15 EU economies under 
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study, e.g. the EU enlargement strongly affects the neighbouring countries in Central Europe 
and less so the countries farther away. Moreover, the state of the world economy affects 
especially those countries having commercial and investment banks with considerable 
international exposure or a strong dependency on exports, and tight financial markets do more 
harm to countries with a housing bubble, such as Spain, Ireland and the UK. By plugging in 
time dummies one would mimic the same exposure to an unspecified risk in all 25 EU countries 
under investigation. We therefore find it more appealing to control for unknown omitted 
variables that are country-specific and that change over time  ) ( it v  through FE-FGLS. FGLS 
works with transformed variables (characterised by an asterisk (*)). It is realistic to assume that 
today’s disturbances are somehow related to past values of the disturbance term  it w , i.e. 
variables are omitted over the entire sample period. The new equation reads as follows:  
t i t i it
it it it it
it it it it i it
u Z
Debt nt Unemployme Growth Inflation Z
DebtperGDP nt Unemployme Growth Inflation Trust
t i
, 1 ,
*
1 2
*
1 2
*
1 2
*
1 2
*
1 2
*
1
*
1 1
*
1 1
*
1 1
*
1 1
*
...
1 ,
+ Δ
+ Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ +
+ + + + + =
− −
− − − −
− − − −
−
φ
ε δ χ β φ
ε δ χ β α
 
(2) 
with Δ indicating that the variables are in the first differences; * indicating that the variables 
have been transformed (purged from autoregressive processes) and that the error term  it u  
fulfils the requirements of the classical linear regression model (it is free from autocorrelation). 
, / / / / / / / / 2 2 1 1
*
− − − − = it it it it Europ Nat Trust Europ Nat Trust Europ Nat Trust Europ Nat Trust ρ ρ
3 2 2 1 1
*
1 − − − − − − = it it it it Inflation Inflation Inflation Inflation ρ ρ ,
3 2 2 1 1
*
1 − − − − − − = it it it it Growth Growth Growth Growth ρ ρ ,
3 2 2 1 1
*
1 − − − − − − = it it it it nt Unemployme nt Unemployme nt Unemployme nt Unemployme ρ ρ ,
3 2 2 1 1
*
1 − − − − − − = it it it it DebtperGDP DebtperGDP DebtperGDP DebtperGDP ρ ρ  
3 2 2 1 1
*
1 − − − − − − = it it it it Z Z Z Z ρ ρ  and  *
2 2 1 1 it it it it it w w w w u = − − = − − ρ ρ    (3) 
Note that the new error terms  it u  are free of autocorrelation and that the omitted variable 
problem is reduced – if not eliminated – by transforming the variables. Since the coefficients  1 ρ  
and  2 ρ  are usually unknown (as in our case), they have been estimated by means of, for 
example, the Cochrane-Orcutt method, an FGLS procedure. In addition, we use country-specific 
fixed effects in our analysis. 
5.2  The issue of structural break 
Given that we would expect a structural break caused by the economic crisis, a test for 
parameter stability is indicated. The Chow test showed a structural break between the pre-crisis 
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period (spring 1999–autumn 2007) and the post-crisis period (spring 2008–autumn 2009). Even 
though we always present results for the full sample period (spring 1999–autumn 2009) in 
column (1) of each table, emphasis should be placed on the separate regressions for the pre-
crisis period (column (2)) and the post-crisis period (column (3)). It also becomes evident that a 
regression over the full sample period can produce misleading results, e.g. the price level seems 
to be of importance in the spring 1999–autumn 2009 period, but it is never significant in the 
sub-periods (pre-crisis and post-crisis) in (columns (2) and (3)).  
5.3  The issue of endogeneity 
When running regressions one must be aware of the possibility that the left-hand side and the 
right-hand side variables influence each other, i.e. the right-hand side variables (inflation, 
growth and unemployment) might be endogenous (affected by a common event) and/or stand in 
a bi-directional relationship with trust (a low level of trust might lead to a self-fulfilling 
prophecy and might thus speed up and worsen an existing downturn). Therefore, we estimated 
the model for the pre-crisis and the post-crisis periods by means of DOLS, a method that 
controls for the endogeneity of the regressors. DOLS is also known as the leads-and-lags 
approach proposed by Stock and Watson (1993) and described by Wooldridge (2009). It can be 
shown that by inserting the leads and lags of the right-hand side variables in the first differences 
the explanatory variables become (super)-exogenous and the regression results thus become 
unbiased. Due to a multicollinearity problem, we included only the first differences of the 
explanatory variables. As we also eliminate autocorrelation – whenever necessary – the DOLS 
estimation turns into a dynamic feasible generalised least squares (DFGLS) estimation. One 
should note that the DOLS/DFGLS estimation technique requires the series to be integrated of 
e.g. order 1 (I(1)) and cointegrated, i.e. to stand in a long-term relationship. 
5.4 Regression  results 
All the tables contain results for the full sample, the pre-crisis and the post-crisis periods. Table 
1 shows the results for the EU-15 country sample concerning citizens’ trust in the national 
government and parliament. Inflation has the expected, negative impact on trust in the national 
government and parliament, in both the full sample and the pre-crisis period. As inflation does 
not play a role in the post-crisis period, the full sample result is driven by the pre-crisis period. 
Growth is an important determinant of trust only in the pre-crisis period,
13 whereas 
unemployment has a significant, negative impact on trust in all the sample periods (pre-crisis, 
post-crisis and the full sample period). Government debt influences trust only in the national 
parliament in the pre-crisis and full sample periods. Overall, we can conclude that the 
increasing/decreasing rate of unemployment is very strongly associated with citizens’ trust in 
the national government and parliament.      
 
 
                                                      
13 In the direct aftermath of the financial crisis (Standard Eurobarometers 69-71.1 or spring 2008 to 
January–February 2009), growth was significantly and negatively related to trust in the national 
government and parliament, supporting the descriptive results of Figures 3 and 5 showing a rally-around-
the-flag effect in the direct aftermath of the financial crisis. As the post-crisis sample in regressions 3 also 
includes observations from Standard Eurobarometers 71 and 72, in which growth and trust increased, the 
overall statistical effect turns insignificant as the two effects even themselves out.  HAS THE FINANCIAL CRISIS SHATTERED CITIZENS’ TRUST? | 11 
 
Table 1. Trust in the national government and parliament, EU-15 country sample, controlling 
for endogeneity (FE-DFGLS or FE-DOLS estimation) 
 (1)   
Government 
trust 
(2)  
Government 
trust 
(3)  
Government 
trust 
(1) 
Parliament 
trust 
(2) 
Parliament 
trust 
(3) 
Parliament 
trust 
 Spring  1999-
autumn 2009 
Spring 1999-
autumn 2007 
Spring 2008-
autumn 2009 
Spring 1999-
autumn 2009 
Spring 1999-
autumn 2007 
Spring 2008-
autumn 2009 
Inflation  -0.79*** -0.99*** 1.44  -0.53**  -0.54**  -1.31 
  -2.71 -3.00 0.74  -2.41 -2.12 -0.83 
Growth  -0.94 5.66***  -2.15 0.04 5.23***  -1.95 
  -0.89 2.59  -1.45 0.04 2.82 -1.51 
Unemployment  -4.38*** -7.35*** -6.10*** -2.84*** -3.59*** -5.42*** 
  -3.87 -4.49 -3.46 -2.89 -2.68 -3.66 
Government 
debt 
-0.25 0.07  0.10  -0.56***  -0.54**  0.08 
 -0.95  0.19  0.20  -2.54  -1.90  0.20 
Durbin-Watson 
statistic 
1.73 1.72 1.88 2.12 2.21 2.07 
R-squared 0.81  0.81  0.91  0.84  0.83  0.94 
Adjusted R
2 0.79  0.78  0.87  0.83  0.80  0.90 
Country fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control for 
endogeneity 
through a 
simple DOLS 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Elimination of 
first order auto 
correlation 
Yes 
DFGLS 
Yes 
DFGLS 
No 
DOLS 
Yes Yes No 
DOLS 
Observations 240  165  75  252  177  75 
Number of 
countries 
15 15 15 15 15 15 
t-values in parentheses 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 
    
    
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Table 2 shows the results for the EU-15 country sample concerning citizens’ trust in the 
European Commission and European Parliament. The two variables inflation and government 
debt (and to a somewhat lesser extent growth) are strongly associated with trust in the European 
Commission and European Parliament in the full and pre-crisis samples, but not in the post-
crisis period. The positive association between growth and trust in the European Commission 
and European Parliament was driven by the strong association in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis, where a dramatic economic downfall was associated with a severe drop of citizens’ trust 
in the two European institutions. The increase of unemployment during and after the crisis has 
led to a decrease in trust in both the European Commission and the European Parliament. 12 | ROTH, NOWAK-LEHMANN D. & OTTER 
 
Table 2. Trust in the European Commission and European Parliament, EU-15 country sample, 
controlling for endogeneity (FE-DFGLS or FE-DOLS estimation) 
  (1)  
European 
Commission 
trust 
(2)  
European 
Commission 
trust 
(3)  
European 
Commission 
trust 
(1) 
European 
Parliament 
trust 
(2) 
European 
Parliament 
trust 
(3) 
European 
Parliament 
trust 
  Spring 1999-
autumn 2009 
Spring 1999-
autumn 2007 
Spring 2008-
autumn 2009 
Spring 1999-
autumn 2009 
Spring 1999-
autumn 2007 
Spring 2008-
autumn 2009 
Inflation  -0.55*** -0.72*** 0.13  -0.76*** -0.88*** 0.47 
  -4.13 -4.06 0.14  -5.58 -4.60 0.47 
Growth  1.39*** 3.23*** 1.18  1.01*  1.96*** 1.64** 
  2.45 3.16 1.52 1.71 1.79 2.10 
Unemployment  0.16 0.32 -2.40***  0.33 0.04 -2.72*** 
  0.26 0.35 -2.78  0.53 0.04 -2.90 
Government 
debt 
-0.44*** -0.72*** 0.30  -0.45*** -0.63*** 0.32 
  -3.34 -3.87 1.20  -3.29 -3.13 1.17 
Durbin-Watson 
statistic 
2.18 2.23 2.00 2.16 2.17 2.09 
R-squared  0.85 0.87 0.92 0.85 0.86 0.93 
Adjusted R
2  0.84 0.85 0.89 0.84 0.84 0.89 
Country fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control for 
endogeneity 
through a 
simple DOLS 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Elimination of 
first order auto 
correlation 
Yes 
DFGLS 
Yes 
DFGLS 
No 
DOLS 
Yes 
DFGLS 
Yes 
DFGLS 
No 
DOLS 
Observations 287  212      212   
Number of 
countries 
15 15 15 15 15 15 
t-values in parentheses 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 
    
    
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Up to now we have only considered an EU-15 country sample for the reason that with an EU-15 
country sample it is possible to extend the timeframe until 1999. We now shift our analysis to 
an EU-25 sample. As the EU-25 has been in place since 2004 our timeframe focuses on the 
period from 2004 to 2009. Thus Table 3 shows the results for the EU-25 country sample 
concerning citizens’ trust in the national governments and parliaments.  
It is interesting to note that in the EU-25 sample inflation does not play a role in either trust in 
the European Commission or trust in the European Parliament when we run separate regressions 
(which are indicated by the test on structural break) for the pre- and the post-crisis periods. HAS THE FINANCIAL CRISIS SHATTERED CITIZENS’ TRUST? | 13 
 
Hence, the full sample result becomes misleading. Growth is not of importance for trust in the 
EU-25. The negative impact of unemployment on trust in the full sample period is fully driven 
by the significance of unemployment in the post-crisis period, when unemployment increased 
dramatically in all EU-25 countries. The increase in debt has led to a decrease in trust in 
national parliaments (but not national governments) in both the pre-crisis and the post-crisis 
periods. This econometric result confirms the first empirical evidence given by Roth (2011). 
Table 3.  Trust in the national government and parliament, EU-25 country sample, controlling 
for endogeneity (FE-DFGLS or FE-DOLS estimation) 
 (1)   
Government 
trust 
(2)  
Government 
trust 
(3)  
Government 
trust 
(1) 
Parliament 
trust 
(2) 
Parliament 
trust 
(3) 
Parliament 
trust 
 Autumn 
2004-autumn 
2009 
Autumn 2004 
-autumn 2007 
Spring 2008-
autumn 2009 
Autumn 
2004-autumn 
2009 
Autumn 
2004-autumn 
2007 
Spring 2008-
autumn 2009 
Inflation  -0.54** -0.35  0.81  -0.66***  -0.34  0.29 
  -2.05 -0.69 0.87  -3.15 -0.91 0.40 
Growth  -0.35 1.94  -1.38 -0.26 1.92*  -1.24 
  -0.52 1.39  -1.33 -0.45 1.71 -1.45 
Unemployment  -2.51*** -2.21  -3.30*** -1.90*** -1.13  -2.39** 
  -3-56 -1.53 -2.51 -3.39 -1.13 -2.31 
Government 
Debt 
-0.70*** -0.77  -0.38  -0.87*** -1.00*** -0.56** 
 -2.78  -1.52  -1.09  -4.39  -2.82  -2.04 
Durbin-Watson 
statistic 
1.99 2.05 1.72 2.06 2.20 1.78 
R-squared 0.87  0.86  0.91  0.92  0.92  0.95 
Adjusted R
2 0.85  0.82  0.88  0.91  0.90  0.94 
Country fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control for 
endogeneity 
through a 
simple DOLS 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Elimination of 
first order auto 
correlation 
Yes 
DFGLS 
Yes 
DFGLS 
No 
DOLS 
Yes 
DFGLS 
No 
DOLS 
No 
DOLS 
Observations 290  165  125  290  165  125 
Number of 
countries 
25 25 25 25 25 25 
t-values in parentheses 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 
    
    
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Table 4 shows the results for the EU-25 country sample concerning citizens’ trust in the 
European Commission and European Parliament. Regression 1 shows the results when 14 | ROTH, NOWAK-LEHMANN D. & OTTER 
 
employing the full sample from 2004 to 2009. If inflation increases during good times (pre-
crisis period), European institutions lose trust. A decline in growth diminishes trust during an 
economic crisis and unemployment and government debt must be considered harmful for trust 
in European institutions if the economy does well. 
Table 4.  Trust in the European Commission and European Parliament, EU-25 country sample, 
controlling for endogeneity (FE-DFGLS or FE-DOLS estimation) 
  (1)  
European 
Commission 
trust 
(2)  
European 
Commission 
trust 
(3)  
European 
Commission 
trust 
(1) 
European 
Parliament 
trust 
(2) 
European 
Parliament 
trust 
(3) 
European 
Parliament 
trust 
  Autumn 2004 
1999-autumn 
2009 
Autumn 
2004-autumn 
2007 
Spring 2008-
autumn 2009 
Autumn 
2004-autumn 
2009 
Autumn 
2004-autumn 
2007 
Spring 2008-
autumn 2009 
Inflation  -0.18 -0.62**  0.18  -0.17 -0.58**  0.27 
  -1.07 -2.25 0.36  -1.02 -2.00 0.52 
Growth  0.66 0.60 1.27**  0.70*  0.32 1.47*** 
  1.62 0.81 2.21 1.67 0.41 2.56 
Unemployment  -0.03 -2.21***  -0.43 0.14 -2.20***  -0.46 
  -0.08 -3.00 -0.60 0.34  -2.83 -0.62 
Government 
Debt 
-0.43*** -0.70*** -0.06  -0.47*** -0.66**  -0.07 
  -2.79 -2.68 -0.28 -3.10 -2.40 -0.34 
Durbin-Watson 
statistic 
2.01 2.18 2.11 2.03 2.16 2.18 
R-squared  0.83 0.86 0.89 0.83 0.86 0.90 
Adjusted R
2  0.80 0.82 0.85 0.81 0.82 0.86 
Country fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control for 
endogeneity 
through a 
simple DOLS 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Elimination of 
first order auto 
correlation 
Yes 
DFGLS 
No 
DOLS 
No 
DOLS 
Yes 
DFGLS 
No 
DOLS 
Yes 
DFGLS 
Observations  290 165 125 290 165 125 
Number of 
countries 
25 25 25 25 25 25 
t-values in parentheses 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 
    
    
Source: Own calculations. 
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6. Conclusion 
We have estimated the relationship between inflation, growth, unemployment, government debt 
and trust in both the national and European governments and in parliament. We have done so 
for the EU-15 and the EU-25 countries as well as for the pre-crisis and the post-crisis periods. 
We have found that it is crucial to look at the two periods separately and to run separate 
regressions, as the full sample period sometimes delivers misleading results. That is, results do 
not change so much with the countries sampled, but rather with analysing the pre-crisis or post-
crisis periods. Four results seem to be particularly noteworthy.  
First, we detect that unemployment leads to a fall in trust in national and European institutions, 
especially during times of crisis and especially in the EU-15 countries. It is important to 
understand that our econometric results refer to real unemployment and not to the fear of losing 
a job. In other words, as long citizens manage to keep their jobs, trust in national governmental 
institutions can be maintained. Thus, government actions that supported enterprises to sustain 
employment levels through short-term work schemes, as have been implemented in Germany 
and Italy, have positively contributed to maintaining citizens’ trust.   
Second, we find that inflation reduces trust in the national and European governmental 
organisations in the EU-15 and the EU-25, but only under good economic conditions. If the 
economy runs poorly, inflation is never an issue.  
Third, we detect a negative association between an increase of debt over GDP and trust in the 
national parliament. This association is apparent during the pre-crisis period in the EU-15 and 
during all time periods in the EU-25. We assume that a negative association between debt over 
GDP and trust in the national parliament would also occur in the EU-15 country sample in the 
post-crisis period, when taking into consideration the newest data from the Standard 
Eurobarometer 72, which was polled in May 2010 in the midst of the eurozone crisis (see also 
Roth, 2011). 
Fourth, in analysing the direct aftermath of the financial crisis our econometric results confirm 
that the immense decline in the real economy (decline in GDP per capita) was associated with 
an increase in citizens’ trust in the national institutions, thus corroborating a rally-around-the-
flag effect. When analysing the entire post-crisis period, this association levels out. This rally-
around-the-flag effect can only be detected for the national institutions, but not for the EU 
institutions.  
Trust levels in the national governments and national parliaments have fallen to historical low 
points in many European countries, especially in the peripheral countries Ireland, Spain, Greece 
and Portugal, which have been the most exposed to the financial crisis (and the ongoing 
eurozone crisis) and experienced strong increases in both unemployment (especially in Ireland 
and Spain) and the levels of debt over GDP (notably in Ireland and Greece) in the aftermath of 
the financial crisis. Hence, several policy steps seem crucial for European policy-makers. 
As unemployment and debt over GDP seem to be crucial explanatory variables for the declining 
trust in national governments and parliaments, European policy-makers should first solve the 
eurozone crisis immediately by ending the strategy of the three no’s: no bail-out, no sovereign 
default and no exit. Helping the periphery countries lower their debt levels and increase their 
employment rates would most likely stabilise citizens’ trust in their national governments and 
parliaments. In particular the falling trust levels in the national parliaments are worrisome as 
this process points to longer-lasting political costs of the financial (and eurozone) crisis. 
Moreover, citizens’ increasing alienation towards their political representatives will result in the 
election of more populist governments (see also Lachmann, 2010) that will be supportive of 
purely national rather than EU interests. While the core countries Germany and France have 
successfully managed to avoid an unemployment crisis, the unemployment rates in Ireland and 16 | ROTH, NOWAK-LEHMANN D. & OTTER 
 
Spain, at approximately 14% and 20% (and around 40% youth unemployment) respectively, are 
unsustainable for social and political cohesion.  
Still, to better evaluate the extent to which the eurozone crisis has influenced citizens’ trust in 
national and European governmental organisations, our future research will have to extend the 
analysis by the latest observations from Eurobarometer 73 (May 2010) and the upcoming 
Eurobarometer 74. The initial empirical evidence (Roth, 2011) points to a dramatic fall in trust 
in the four peripheral countries, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain.    
| 17 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Descriptive statistics, EU-25 country sample 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
Net trust in the national government  324 -16.087  31.00427  -84  61 
Net trust in the national parliament  324 -14.6931  36.1299  -90  70.7 
Net trust in the European Commission  324 26.14281  16.31247 -32  55.6 
Net trust in the European Parliament  324 29.76692  16.97112 -36  62.9 
GDP per capita growth  300 0.541489  2.570732  -11.0286  6.388967 
Unemployment rate  324 7.462191  2.942832 2.75  18.9 
Inflation   324 104.5 7.5  90  141.6 
Government consumption in % of GDP  300 19.13637  2.98805  13.28673  28.0771 
Government debt in % of GDP  324 47.43194  27.37148 3.5  115.55 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
 
 
Table A2. Descriptive statistics, EU-15 country sample 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
Net trust in the national government  286 -5.57868  25.85205 -64  61 
Net trust in the national parliament  299 3.692238  25.82533 -58  70.7 
Net trust in the European Commission  345 21.65702  18.65586  -40.2  57.4 
Net trust in the European Parliament  345 27.67313  18.38821 -36  61.7 
GDP per capita growth  341 0.664309  1.593545  -7.02541  4.79103 
Unemployment Rate  345 6.902464  2.645603 1.85  18.3 
Inflation   345 98.0 7.58  78.9  112.37 
Government consumption in % of GDP  342 20.01607  3.25287  13.4379  28.0771 
Government debt in % of GDP  319 59.25502  27.50598 5.55  119 
Source: Own calculations. 
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